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ABSTRACT: This article offers a novel interpretation of Jacques Derrida’s deconstructive 
thought in terms of model theory. Taking its cue from Paul Livingston’s Politics of Logic, which 
interprets Derrida as a thinker of inconsistent totalities, the article argues that Livingston’s 
description of Derrida is unable to accommodate certain consistency-driven aspects of 
Derrida’s work. These aspects pertain to Derrida’s notion of ”iterability”. The article 
demonstrates that the context-bound nature of iteration – the altering repetition of any 
discrete unit of meaning – and Derrida’s possibilist view of context – that a context need not 
be part of the actual world to merit consideration – lead to the possibility of articulating 
iteration with the model-theoretical notion of truth. In model theory, truth is a relation 
between a sentence and the class of models in which the sentence is true. Arguing that the 
same holds for Derrida’s iterations and contexts, the article, in presenting the first rigorous 
truth-definition internal to deconstructive thought, outlines a ”fifth orientation of thought” 
alongside the four orientations listed in Livingston’s book: if, according to Livingston, one can 
relate the whole of being to the whole of thought in one of four different ways, the aspects of 
Derrida’s work that do not fall within this schema call out for another possible orientation. 
KEYWORDS: Iterability; Undecidability; Model Theory; Possible Worlds; Derrida; Hintikka; 
Livingston 
INTRODUCTION 
Paul Livingston’s Politics of Logic is to be saluted as that rare and valuable piece of 
philosophical literature: a splendidly imaginative and rigorously argued work, it is 
uniquely capable of rethinking and thereby recasting virtually all of the great divides 
of contemporary philosophy. It is, in the best way imaginable, a work to rupt our 
dogmatic slumbers. 
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Yet it is also a very recent work; and works of such magnitude tend to be 
somewhat opaque to their immediate contemporaries. Politics of Logic, from this 
vantage, is best described as a text in the sense defined by Jacques Derrida: ‘A text is 
not a text unless it hides from the first comer, from the first glance, the law of its 
composition and the rules of its game’1. 
Thus the reflections that the following pages have to offer, though seeking to 
problematize a certain line of argument in Livingston’s work, do not presume to 
evaluate its general claim—the claim, that is, that the signature effect of the ‘linguistic 
turn’ in twentieth-century philosophy lies in its having foregrounded the problem of 
formalization in a way intimately connected with the most pressing issues of 
contemporary political life. The logico-mathematical formalization of language, 
Livingston says, has been able, in an unprecedented way, to recognise and articulate 
what paradoxes emerge when language meets its limits. In Livingston’s view this is 
closely paralleled by the intense focus of continental thinkers on the paradoxes 
inherent in each and every system, whether of political, communal, and social 
organization, or, more generally, of conceptual and intellectual organization. In both 
domains every totality can be seen to include some element that reflects the totality 
while escaping its structural undergirdings and thereby generates paradoxes (in logic, 
Livingston’s key example is the Gödel sentence that expresses a truth not provable in 
the system; in political philosophy, conversely, one important instance is the extra-
legal sovereign who institutes the legal order). It is with a great degree of perspicacity 
and detail that Livingston elaborates this argument. Hence the necessity of stating 
once more that the following critical engagement with the work is neither global in its 
scope nor at all destructive in its aims. 
What I shall briefly argue herein is that the list of four ‘orientations of thought’ 
drawn by Livingston, four ways to relate thought to being, of which the fourth is 
Livingston’s addition to a list originally drawn by Alain Badiou, may be further 
supplemented by a fifth orientation. Yet what are these orientations? ‘Since each 
orientation preconditions the thinkability of being as a whole’, Livingston writes, ‘we 
may indeed take them to amount to a series of positional total relations to the infinite 
totality of what is, or what is sayable of it’2. The brief definitions Livingston offers of 
the orientations are as follows: 
Paradoxico-critical: Any position that, recognizing reflexivity and its 
paradoxes, nevertheless draws out the consequences of the being of the totality, 
1 Derrida (2004), p. 69. 
2 Livingston (2011), p. 53. Referred to hereafter in text as PL. 
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and sees the effects of these paradoxes always are operative within the One of 
this totality. 
Generic: Any position that, recognizing reflexivity and its paradoxes, denies the 
being of the totality and sees these paradoxes as traversing an irreducible Many. 
Criteriological/Constructivist: Any position that attempts to delimit the 
totality consistently from a stable point outside of it. 
Onto-Theological: Any position that sees the totality as complete and 
consistent in itself, though beyond the grasp of finite cognition, which is located 
simply within the totality. (PL 58) 
Of these orientations, the first, ‘paradoxico-critical’ one, is Livingston’s own coinage; 
the other three are drawn from Badiou. As already noted, each stands for a particular 
way of relating the thinkable, or the sayable, to whatever can be said to be; but these 
broadly metaphysical or ontological stances are further differentiated by how they 
relate to the more specifically formal question of totality. There are but few options 
open in this respect. Firstly, one may affirm the totality of being or of thought to be 
both consistent and complete (the ‘onto-theological’ orientation). Secondly, one may 
affirm the consistency of the totality but deny its completeness, which can be done in 
two ways: either A) to postulate ever new metalanguages able to resolve the paradoxes 
of lower-level languages yet unable to avoid encountering paradoxes of their own 
(‘criteriological/constructivist’) or B) to pursue the potential disruption of new truths 
into existing situations by holding to no other rule than formal consistency (‘generic’). 
Thirdly, and finally, one may affirm the completeness of the totality but deny its 
consistency (‘paradoxico-critical’), seeking thereby to articulate the formal-syntactical 
loci where the total system can be seen both to found itself and to founder on its 
inconsistency. 
In this respect the orientations are partitioned according to which side of a 
metalogical duality each of them falls. This metalogical duality that Livingston has so 
perceptively formulated arises from his equally perceptive take on the general 
philosophical consequences of Gödel’s famous incompleteness theorems. Gödel, in 
Livingston’s reading, in effect presents us with two options: we can opt for 
completeness or for consistency, yet we cannot, if we are in the position to choose 
between them (as we would not be if we held either an onto-theological stance or a 
pre-critical criteriological one), choose both. Livingston writes: 
More generally, then, we might put the situation as follows. It is not in fact the 
case that the implications of the Russell paradox or any of the related semantic 
paradoxes immediately force us to reject, as Badiou claims, the ‘One-All.’ The 
effect of the paradox is rather to split the One-All into two interpretative 
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hypotheses and force a decision between them. Either we may reject the ‘All’ of 
totality while preserving the ‘One’ of consistency—this is Badiou’s solution—or, 
alternatively, we may preserve the All of totality while sacrificing, at least in 
certain cases, the One of consistency. From a metalogical perspective, in view of 
the reflexive paradoxes and antinomies, there is, in other words, a rigorous 
duality or dichotomy, what we may call the metalogical duality between 
consistency (with incompleteness) and completeness (with inconsistency). (PL 53) 
Thus we are forced to think of language either as able to express all truths but unable 
to avoid paradoxes or as able to overcome paradoxes but unable to reach all possible 
truths. What Badiou terms his own generic orientation opts for the latter, while the 
paradoxico-critical orientation, comprising thinkers as divergent as Jacques Lacan, 
Giorgio Agamben, the later Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Derrida, affirms the former. 
The whole of Politics of Logic consists in a rigorous and impressive argument in favour 
of the paradoxico-critical orientation. 
In what follows I will suggest, however, that Derrida’s work may be considered to 
embody—or at least to provide the possibility for conceiving—a fifth orientation. I will 
not as yet name this orientation. Deconstructive thought, I will argue, does not 
necessarily fall, without remainder, within the paradoxico-critical orientation. On this 
view the paradoxical features of his work would be able to function otherwise than as 
intra-systemic locations where the inconsistency of the system is registered. A paradox 
might, on this reading, signal a place where a transformative expansion of the system 
is called for; it would then indicate that a truth in excess of the system makes itself felt 
within the system. This reading, however, is not to be taken as a refutation of 
Livingston’s decision to group Derrida among the paradoxico-critical thinkers. That 
both strains may be identified in Derrida’s work, strains upon which the Gödelian 
trial stamps the sign of incommensurability, indicates that some more profound 
structure might yet be articulated. In the first part of this article I will lay the 
foundations for this articulation. In the two following sections I will elaborate this 
structure by interrogating the possibility of a Derridean notion of truth. The fourth 
section relates this notion to Livingston’s paradoxico-critical orientation. In the 
concluding chapter I will define and name the fifth orientation of thought. 
I: Inconsistency or incompleteness, universal medium or calculus: A Collingwoodian Parallax 
In An Essay on Metaphysics, R. G. Collingwood defines philosophical analysis, the ‘work 
of disentangling and arranging questions’, as the work of  ‘detecting presuppositions’3: 
to engage in metaphysical analysis is to ‘attempt to find out what absolute 
3 Collingwood (1998), p. 39–40. 
                                                     
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 165 
presuppositions have been made by this or that person or group of persons, on this or 
that occasion or group of occasions, in the course of this or that piece of thinking’4. 
Such ultimate presuppositions, though tacit and unreflected, are distinguished by 
being so consistent and consequential as to yield themselves to systematic scrutiny. 
For what such presuppositions mean, first of all, is that some general question is 
implicitly answered, and thus assumed to be answerable, although these questions are 
often identified only subsequently. A system acquires a great degree of consistency 
through the answer it presupposes—or the question that one of its answers 
presupposes—without feeling the need to treat it as a systematic premise. 
In this sense, Politics of Logic, though it never references Collingwood, is intensely 
Collingwoodian, and nowhere more so than in its emphasis on the decision forced 
upon us by Gödel’s theorems. Innumerable thinkers have found it incumbent on 
themselves to reflect on what the theorems imply, but none, in truth, have gone so far 
as Livingston in identifying just what a systematic watershed point it is. Faced with the 
consequences of Gödel’s theorems, most thinkers, whether in the ‘analytic’ or 
‘continental’ camp, have in Livingston’s view opted for one reading of them, affirming 
either the inconsistency or the incompleteness of all systems. But none have identified 
this as a matter of choice, as a critical moment of decision, whose consequences are 
truly momentous (PL 52). That one is forced to choose between inconsistency and 
incompleteness points to a tacit presupposition that meets all the Collingwoodian 
criteria. It is, in short, an ultimate presupposition of twentieth-century philosophy. 
One might even venture that it is the ultimate presupposition of twentieth-century 
philosophy. 
Yet it is not the only candidate for this position. It contends for this place with 
another presupposition—explicitly formulated as a Collingwoodian presupposition—
that is in fact formulated from within a position captured by Livingston’s metalogical 
duality. I am referring to the distinction drawn by Jaakko Hintikka, the eminent 
Finnish logician, between language as universal medium and language as calculus. Such, for 
Hintikka, is ‘the ultimate presupposition of twentieth-century philosophy’. 
Philosophers who see language as a universal medium tend to think of it, in Hintikka’s 
words, as ‘an inescapable intermediary between me and the world, a medium I 
cannot dispense with’5. This inescapability has the unfortunate effect of making it 
impossible for me to ‘discuss in my language the relationships that connect it with the 
world’ (LUCR 3), because if language always already determines how I relate to the 
world, I cannot possibly say how my relation to the world might be different. To say 
4 Collingwood (1998), p. 47. 
5 Hintikka (1997), p. 3. Referred to hereafter in text as LUCR. 
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that my language might be differently calibrated with reality would be to contradict 
the very structure that allows me to say anything in the first place. If, for instance, I 
believed that language reveals the world, I could not conceive of language as merely 
indicating shreds and patches of it. This is because the latter hypothesis would be 
possible only if language had already revealed this possibility. Thus the indicative view 
of language would be untenable as an essential definition of what language is. It 
would rather offer an explanation to an intra-linguistic phenomenon that does not 
really define the being of language. No shred-and-patch truth can usurp the place of 
truth-as-revelation. There can be no non-revelatory talk of language and therefore no 
exit from revelatory language. Hence the semantics of my language will remain, as 
Hintikka says, ineffable: I cannot vary the relation between language and world, thus I 
cannot know what it would be like if it were different, therefore I do not really know 
what kind of relation it is. ‘Everything we say’, Hintikka writes, ‘already presupposes 
the one language we are using, including the semantical relations in virtue of which it 
can be used to say something’, of which the corollary is that ‘we cannot step outside 
language and examine its relations to the world’ (LUCR 22). 
Conversely, those who think of language as calculus are apt to emphasise our 
capacity to vary our interpretation of our language and to opt for a different language 
should it benefit our inquiry. We can always reinterpret language without committing 
ourselves to any single language that would determine how we go about the business 
of reinterpretation. It is necessary to note here that to think of language as calculus 
does not mean considering it as a formal play of empty mathematical functions. It is 
rather to view language such ‘that it can in principle be reinterpreted like a calculus’ 
(LUCR xi). There is, in other words, no one single domain of being that decides once 
and for all how the truth of a sentence is to be taken. Hence Hintikka’s remark that, 
although the conceptual issue is not limited to logical theory alone (LUCR ix), he 
‘would now speak rather of the model-theoretical tradition in logic and philosophy of 
language’ (LUCR xi). To view language model-theoretically is to treat every sentence 
in relation to a model. A model is, roughly speaking, a structured set, whether it be a 
practical state of affairs or a geometrical structure. A sentence says what it says by 
specifying a class of models. What the elements in each model are is ultimately an 
indifferent matter. The only requirement is that each element fit the structure 
specified by the sentence. Yet what may look like the same sentence, consisting as it 
does of such-and-such elements, may be taken as many different sentences. ‘Peter is 
my rock’ does not refer to the same individual when said by a sentimental Jesus as it 
does when said by the sentimental wife of a man called Peter. Thus we have two 
sentences of which the specified classes of models are non-equivalent. A sentence, 
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then, irrespective of its surface form, means something only in relation to a class of 
models in which it is true. Hence Hintikka’s statement on which it would be beneficial 
to meditate at length: ‘A sentence means what it means by telling you what the world 
would be like it if were true’ (LUCR 7). 
This gives rise to an intriguing parallax effect. The ultimate presupposition 
discovered by Livingston is the metalogical duality that orients philosophies towards 
affirming either the inconsistency or the incompleteness of any system. The one 
argued for by Hintikka is the distinction between language as universal medium and 
language as calculus. Surprisingly, Hintikka’s distinction falls squarely in the scope of 
Livingston’s duality, while the latter, in its turn, seems wholly unmarked by the 
former. Hintikka, in other words, thinks that he sees language from afar, coolly 
observing its movements, while, in Livingston’s view, he actually occupies a mobile 
position inside a broader duality. 
Yet the situation is not quite as straightforward as it seems. The two movements 
comprising this parallax view need to be more precisely interrogated if any clarity is to 
be obtained. In the next section I will do this by looking the remarkably different ways 
in which Hintikka deals with Gödel and Derrida. 
II: Hintikka’s Derrida 
Hintikka does not have a whole lot of good to say about Derrida.6 In his view Derrida 
has ‘never been able to deconstruct successfully a single truly significant centrally 
philosophical (logical, epistemological or metaphysical) idea’. Instead, Hintikka 
snidely notes, he has opted to meditate ‘on deep philosophical concepts like that of a 
postcard’. No wonder, then, that in Hintikka’s book Derrida is marked down as ‘a 
largely unsuccessful deconstructionist’ (LUCR 2). Elsewhere he even goes to the length 
of saying that Derrida is not really a philosopher but rather a prophet, and a minor 
one at that7, because it really cannot be said of him, as it can of some others, that he 
‘should have known better’ when it comes to choosing between the two views of 
language8. A philosopher can err, however grievous the error may be; a prophet 
cannot, on pain of being a false one. This applies in particular to Derrida, who, in 
Hintikka’s view, is a direct descendant of Heidegger insofar as he sees the world ‘as a 
text to be interpreted’ (LUCR 10). For if this is the case, and if this task of 
6 The following criticisms of Hintikka’s dismissal of Derrida were first formulated in Poutiainen (2010). 
The article, written and published in Finnish, also contains in inchoate form some elements of the 
interpretation of Derrida—vis-à-vis Hintikka’s distinction between language as universal medium and 
language as calculus—that I am presenting here. 
7 Hintikka (2001), pp. 42–45. 
8 Hintikka (2006), p. 55. 
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interpretation ‘cannot be carried out by means of the normal rational uses of 
language’ (LUCR 11), then evidently it follows that Derrida’s notion of ‘text’ is merely 
a perverse outgrowth of an already perverse doctrine. At the heart of this doctrine, 
again, lies the conviction that the semantics of our language cannot be expressed. 
Truth, if truth there be, is ineffable. 
But it is Derrida’s reference to Gödel in Dissemination that Hintikka most 
vehemently puts his pincers on. Derrida, whom Hintikka cites in Barbara Johnson’s 
1981 translation, writes: 
An undecidable proposition, as Gödel demonstrated in 1931, is a proposition 
which, given a system of axioms governing a multiplicity, is neither an analytical 
nor a deductive consequence of those axioms, nor in contradiction with them, 
neither true nor false with respect to those axioms. Tertium datur, without 
synthesis.9 
Hintikka takes this to imply that, Derrida’s undecidable ‘infrastructures’ being 
equivalent to Gödel’s formal systems (though Hintikka never specifies just what these 
infrastructures are), there can be for Derrida no consistent ‘infrastructural’ system, 
and hence no conceptual means by which to express the truth of any proposition 
within that system. He is thus found guilty of taking Gödel’s and Tarski’s combined 
results as licensing a universalist conception of language. For if the truth of a language 
can only be defined in a higher metalanguage, as Tarski is often taken to have 
conclusively shown, and if Gödel has demonstrated that every such metalanguage 
must necessarily be either inconsistent or incomplete, then it is not possible to bracket 
our working-language commitments and examine its semantics from an outside 
vantage. (LUCR 16–17) 
There are many problems with this description, beginning with Hintikka’s 
unscholarly decision not to lay bare the sources of his interpretation. The link 
between ‘undecidables’ and ‘infrastructures’, for one thing, is not one that Derrida 
himself makes. In fact it comes from Rodolphe Gasché’s The Tain of the Mirror, though 
Hintikka does not reference this book. Yet Hintikka’s tendency to group Derrida with 
Richard Rorty as prophets of philosophy’s doom10 serves as a useful clue. I have 
already cited Hintikka’s belittling remark that the philosophically frivolous Derrida 
has been content to focus ‘on deep philosophical concepts like that of a postcard’ 
(LUCR 2). Hintikka, however, never goes to the trouble of actually citing Derrida’s The 
Post Card, which, had he read it, he might have recognized as a critical engagement 
with the very Heidegger whose descendant he takes Derrida to be. There is, however, 
9 Derrida (2004), p. 229. 
10 Hintikka (2006), p. 55. 
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another place where all these references converge: all, in fact, are to be found in 
Rorty’s book Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. This work—written by a thinker who is 
easily Hintikka’s principal bête noire and hence liable to have been read by Hintikka—
contains an essay that 1) treats Derrida as a Heideggerian ‘destructor’ of philosophy, 
2) muses for some time on Derrida’s ‘post cards’, and 3) engages at some length with 
Gasché’s infrastructural interpretation of Derrida11. It is therefore quite reasonable to 
assume that every detail of Derrida’s work that Hintikka mentions is drawn from this essay by 
Rorty (and these are the only details—save for one, also to be found in the same essay, 
and equally traceable back to Rorty (LUCR 2)12—he mentions anywhere in his work). 
Yet be Hintikka’s sources what they may, it can be said, at any rate, that from 
Hintikka’s essay a Derrida emerges who views formal systems as complete but 
inconsistent. A rough description, to be sure, yet it gives rise to another strange 
convergence that ought not to be overlooked. For in terms of Livingston’s metalogical 
duality, Hintikka’s Derrida is, just as he is in Politics of Logic, a proponent of what 
Livingston would call the paradoxico-critical orientation of thought. Both Livingston’s 
and Hintikka’s Derrida opts for completeness without consistency. 
This, even more surprisingly, is precisely the question through whose rabbit-hole 
Hintikka falls and is then captured in the scope of Livingston’s duality. In arguing 
ardently for a reading of Gödel that decides in favour of consistence without completeness, 
Hintikka seems to occupy a position roughly describable as criteriological. Yet it is not 
just any incompleteness that Hintikka goes for, as there are, let us say, optimistic and 
pessimistic ways to understand the issue. That Hintikka inclines to optimism can be 
readily seen from his claim to have shown ‘that Tarski’s and Gödel’s results simply do 
not have the negative philosophical implications which they first seemed to possess 
and which they have usually been taken to imply’ (LUCR 17). Hintikka distinguishes 
three different ways of interpreting the incompleteness theorems: descriptive 
incompleteness, semantic incompleteness, and deductive incompleteness. Hintikka 
describes them as follows: 
(i) Descriptive completeness is an attribute of a nonlogical axiom system T. It 
means that the models of T comprise all and only intended models, i.e. that T is 
sound and is able to rule out all ‘nonstandard’ (unintended) models. 
(ii) Semantic completeness is an attribute of axiomatizations of logic. Such an 
aximatization is complete if and only if the axiomatization enumerates 
recursively all (and only) valid formulas, i.e., formulas true on every 
interpretation. 
11 Rorty (1989), pp. 122–137; see especially p. 126. 
12 See Rorty (1991), p. 161. 
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(iii) Deductive completeness is an attribute of an axiomatization of a nonlogical 
axiom system. It presupposes that this nonlogical axiom system is combined with 
an axiomatization of logic. A nonlogical axiom system T is deductively complete 
if and only if from it one can derive (by means of logical axioms and rules of 
inference) either C or ~C for each sentence C in the language of the theory. 
(LUCR 40) 
The reflections following this tripartition are of distinct importance, as they exhibit, 
quite unwittingly, just the sort of characteristics delineated by Livingston’s account. 
For Hintikka goes on to say that on a correct and sober reading of Gödel’s theorems 
we are kept from affirming descriptive incompleteness. On such a reading it is possible 
to ‘impose stricter requirements on models’ so as to reduce their number. This ‘makes 
descriptive completeness easier to achieve’, provided that ‘we are willing to give up 
the semantical completeneness of the underlying logic’, as ‘the number of formulas 
true in all (remaining) models grows’ so as to render us unable to enumerate them 
recursively (LUCR 40–41). This means that the more precisely a theory delineates 
what it can accept as objects belonging to its domain, the greater its ability to rule out 
the objects it cannot accept; but then an ever greater number of formulas are able to 
reach out to the models, with the result that any semantic-deductive completeness for 
the theory and the logic underlying it cannot be reached. ’This opens interesting 
vistas’, Hintikka says, and he ends his discussion thus: 
But doesn’t the resulting inevitable semantical incompleteness of the underlying 
logic change the situation? I don’t see that it does. Admittedly, before the logical 
consequences of a nonlogical theory T are spelled out, theory T does not yet 
reach out fully to things in themselves, independent of such by-products of our 
language as merely apparent possibilities concerning the world. But these 
consequences have to be obtained one by one no matter whether the logic is 
completely axiomatizable or not. What is crucial, in neither case is there any absolute 
limit which cannot be transgressed. It may be that our conceptual system and the 
language in which it is codified distort what we say of reality by means of this 
language. However, there is no limit beyond which these distortions cannot be eliminated. 
The only difference is that when the underlying logic is completely 
axiomatizable, the progressive elimination of the distorting effects of our 
language can be accomplished by a mechanical enumeration, whereas in the 
absence of complete axiomatization this gradual elimination depends on 
logician’s ingenuity in coming up with new principles. This makes an important 
difference to the philosophy of mathematics, but not to the realism-idealism 
contrast. (LUCR 41, my emphases) 
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Here paradox looms; yet before approaching this issue it is necessary to take a closer 
look at the possibility of forming a different interpretation of Derrida whose inflections 
are chiefly model-theoretical. 
III: World, context, model: multiplicities of reference 
In both a historical and a practical perspective, model theory is a predominantly 
mathematical or mathematico-logical approach to phenomena, although its import, if 
adequately grasped, is arguably much broader than that13. In a fairly loose and non-
technical way it can be defined as a philosophical outlook for which the truth of every 
statement is determined in relation to the models it specifies. It therefore has a 
semantic rather than syntactic view of truth insofar as it views truth as a relation 
between a sentence and its models. Hence model theorists speak of ‘truth in a model’ 
instead of ‘truth as disquotation’, ‘truth as coherence’, or ‘truth as disconcealment’. A 
model, or ‘model set’, can be roughly defined as a description of some state of affairs. 
Models are called sets because they contain individual members; as sets they are 
structured sets, because these members are not atomic but interrelated. A model is 
therefore a domain consisting of entities and their relations. The set of all equivalent 
model sets—to which belongs the subset of all possible worlds that are alternatives to 
one another—is contained in what is called a model system.14 On this view a sentence 
is true if and only if it can be ‘imbedded’ in a model set. This, Hintikka explains, is 
equivalent to saying that ‘a sentence is true in some possible world (is satisfiable) if it is 
true in the world described by some state-description’15. Model theory, when 
unmoored from a strictly mathematical viewpoint, is often given a flesh-and-blood 
ontology by framing it as some form or other of possible-worlds semantics. Thus a model 
is seen to contain a set of possible worlds, expressed in propositions, and the set of 
individuals and their relations that those propositions specify. It is important to note 
here that models ‘may be finite, and in fact very small, whereas state-descriptions are 
extremely large’16. Hence an emphasis on the finiteness of models also serves as a 
reminder that a possible world need not be a possible universe. A possible world may 
be no more than a possible event-situation in just one small part of the actual 
universe. 
A model, therefore, need not contain only actual individuals. The states of affairs 
it specifies do not have to form a part of the actual world. Nor do they have to exist 
13 See e.g. Porter (2005), 207–209. 
14 Hintikka (1962), p. 40–48. 
15 Hintikka (1973), p. 11. 
16 Hintikka (1973), p. 12. 
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apart from the actual world. This means that the model-theoretical version of reality 
is neither an actualist nor a modal-realist one. For a model to be epistemically 
relevant it suffices that a given statement either 1) hold for some possible world of the 
model in the same way as it holds for the actual world or 2) express a state of affairs 
that is at variance with an actual one yet cannot be excised from any adequate 
conceptualization of the different ways our world might be. Among the insights of this 
view is that it does not postulate any discrepancy between meaning and reference. 
Hintikka uses the term referential multiplicity to describe how a sentence may be 
satisfiable in a number of possible worlds even if the referents at which the sentence 
aims are wildly dissimilar. Referential multiplicity, then, means that the extension of a 
sentence is not limited to just one individual. Thus the truth of the sentence is not 
decided once and for all by the existence or nonexistence of its referent in the actual 
world. On the contrary: it is manifold and spread across a range of possible states of 
affairs. This, in Hintikka’s view, constitutes in great part the meaning of meaning: 
‘The only entities needed in the so-called theory of meaning are, in many interesting 
cases, merely what is required in order for the expressions of our language to be able 
to refer in certain more complicated situations. Instead of the theory of reference and 
the theory of meaning we perhaps ought to speak in some cases of the theory of 
simple and of multiple reference, respectively’17. 
It has been suggested by Christopher Norris18 that Derrida’s notion of iterability 
may be helpfully articulated with modal logic. From this suggestion—which is still 
problematic in that it does not take model theory into consideration—it might be 
inferred that Derrida’s thinking is logically articulable with a model-theoretical 
semantics. This articulation would require that a strictly Derridean notion of truth be 
constructible. Model theory, it bears repeating, holds that truth is always truth in a 
model. Model-theoretic truth is truth with respect to a given structure. Logical truth, 
accordingly, is defined as that which holds in all possible models. Derrida, of course, is 
not likely to have thought of truth in such terms, which is readily seen in the 
nonstandard terminology he uses in describing the Gödel sentence19; to this extent 
Hintikka’s misreading of him is forgivable. But the reasons for this are predominantly 
historical—and hence, to a great degree, contingent. 
Yet there is, in fact, a passage in the essay ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ that may serve as a 
clue to formulating a Derridean notion of truth. At issue in this passage is a complex 
17 Hintikka (1979), p. 145. 
18 Norris (2006). 
19 See Hintikka (1997), p. 16. 
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interweaving of truth and repetition in which the latter is treated as a condition of the 
former: 
What is is not what it is, identical and identical to itself, unique, unless it adds to 
itself the possibility of being repeated as such. And its identity is hollowed out by 
that addition, withdraws itself in the supplement that presents it. The ... 
structure of repetition can thus no longer be dominated by the value of truth. 
On the contrary, the opposition between the true and the untrue is entirely 
comprehended, inscribed, within this structure or this generalized writing. The 
true and the untrue are both species of repetition. And there is no repetition 
possible without the graphics of supplementarity, which supplies, for the lack of a full 
unity, another unit that comes to relieve it, being enough of the same and 
enough other so that it can replace by addition. Thus, on the one hand, 
repetition is that without which there would be no truth: the truth of being in 
the intelligible form of ideality discovers in the eidos that which can be repeated, 
being the same, the clear, the stable, the identifiable in its equality with itself.20 
In view of my present argument the single most interesting sentence here is ‘The true 
and the untrue are both species of repetition’. A full appreciation of the sentence 
would call for a long and painstaking reading that I am unable to undertake here. 
Instead I will extract from it four semantic axioms with which all of Derrida’s thought, I 
argue, may be shown to be in full solidarity. Thus: 
1. It is impossible to partition (well-formed and nontautological) statements into such as are true 
whenever repeated and such as are false whenever repeated. For either truth or untruth to be 
predicable of a statement there need be no more than one situation in which the 
statement is true. It is necessary, however, that there be at least one such situation. 
2. Such situations need only be possible situations. It applies only to certain kinds of 
statements that they should be true at one time and false at another time. Diachrony 
is therefore not the sole temporal horizon of repetition. Repetition is also (logically) 
synchronous. 
3. The sense of each situation corresponds to a unit belonging to a totality of which the unit is an 
instance. Such units can be replaced by one another without interrupting the identity of 
the totality. They are therefore alternatives to one another. From this it follows that 
all those situations in which one unit might be replaced by another are alternative 
situations. This lends further support to the thesis of synchronous repetition. 
4. Truth is therefore a relation that holds between a situation and a unit. And given that the 
sets of units and situations are formed by additive substitution, it follows that 
conceptual truths are generated by the same process. A concept specifies the range of 
20 Derrida (2004), p. 166. 
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substitutions that do not break the correlation of units and situations. When a 
statement correlates a situation with a unit, it is repeated as true; when not, it is 
repeated as false. 
Generalizing this axiomatic I would suggest that the Derridean notion of truth 
might be given the form of a neologism. Thus I hold that a sentence is iteratrue 
whenever its repetition correlates a situation and a unit. Conversely, it is non-iteratrue 
whenever no such correlation arises. ‘The truth of the book is decidable’, Derrida states in 
‘Le double séance’21. Thus a sentence is a priori neither iteratrue nor non-iteratrue. 
‘The value of the book (true/false) is not intrinsic to it’, Derrida continues22. For either value 
to be accorded to any sentence, the latter must first be (conceivable as being) repeated 
in a situation. By being repeated in a situation the sentence is indexed as having that 
situation as its interpretation. It is then either iteratrue or non-iteratrue depending on 
whether or not a correlated unit is an existent element in the situation. 
Such would be the logic of Derridean iteratruth. There is much evidence in 
Derrida’s writings to warrant this interpretation, although, for lack of space, I cannot 
enter here into the sort of prolonged textual argumentation that it properly calls for. 
By now it should be clear, however, that Hintikka is quite wrong to see Derrida as a 
proponent of the language-as-universal-medium view. For even if the reading above 
were false, it would be only partially false, of which the corollary would be that 
Derrida’s thinking is somewhat inconsistent concerning these issues. And if it were 
thus inconsistent, there would be no reason, as I hope to have shown, why at least one 
segment of it should not be reinterpreted in a way that is consistent with model-
theoretical approaches. 
IV: Iteratruth and paradox 
This, however, does not quite settle the larger issue of Derrida’s relation to 
Livingston’s metalogical duality. It merely leaves this relation in an unresolved 
tension. I pose as a hypothesis that a model-theoretical view is less consonant with 
Livingston’s paradoxico-critical orientation. There would be two prima facie reasons for 
this. The first is that model theory is a predominantly semantic orientation while 
paradoxico-criticism is a formal-syntactic orientation (PL 178). The second would be 
that model theory aims to deal with paradox and contradiction as relations of 
incompossibility between models (so that a paradoxical expression is paradoxical only 
because it leaves undecided the model in which it is to be interpreted), while 
paradoxico-criticism, true to its name, sees in the excess of sense over reference a 
21 Derrida (2004), p. 199. 
22 Derrida (2004), p. 200. 
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structural inadequation that causes the structure to reflect on itself and thus results in 
the emergence of paradox (PL 178). These differences between the orientations would 
then come to a head in the divergence of their views as regards the relation of 
paradox to meaning. Paradoxico-criticism, writes Livingston, ‘understands the excess 
of signification, and hence the paradoxes of reflexivity, not as problematic effects of 
language but as constitutive conditions for (the possibility of) “meaning” as such’ (PL 179). 
Model theory, in its turn, at least as exemplified by the likes of Hintikka, would hold 
just the opposite: that paradox is only the semantic effect of some sort of epistemic 
mismatch between sentences, possible worlds, and models. Effects of this kind would 
be mere ‘by-products of our language’, as Hintikka says, such as ‘merely apparent 
possibilities concerning the world’ (LUCR 41). A merely apparent possibility for which 
a theory does not allow would therefore fall within a nonstandard or unintended model, 
that is, within a model that the theory cannot include without contradicting its 
axioms. 
Hence the right way to rid a theory of apparent paradox would be to work out its 
axiomatization with the aim that it should ultimately reach out to the specified models 
and none besides. One might say, to take a Derridean example, that Husserl’s theory 
of writing remains contradictory to the extent that the predicates specifying writing 
(exteriority, erasure, worldliness, non-intuition) can also be found to specify its 
opposite, namely, speech, and vice versa (writing, like speech, is a transcendental 
guarantor of truth). There is a possible world in which the same predicate specifies 
both speech and writing. Hence there is also a model in which speech and writing are 
logically equivalent. By being shown to contain an unintended model, then, the 
theory is thereby rendered descriptively incomplete. Any descriptive completeness 
would be attainable to it only by restricting the models it allows so as to keep the 
contradictories from coinciding. Writing would have to be kept from acceding to the 
status of a transcendental condition while speech would have to be completely 
interiorized so as to bar it from falling into worldly exteriority. The massive and 
unavoidable consequence to which Derrida’s reading of Husserl leads is that no such 
restriction can be made without doing great injustice to the essences involved. Writing 
is not writing without its transcendental status, speech is not speech if it cannot be 
proffered in an outside. There is, then, a limit beyond which the distortions inherent 
in the Husserlian theory of writing cannot be eliminated; a fatal limit, this, since the 
fundamental axioms of Husserlian phenomenology are thereby seen to be inconsistent 
and inherently paradoxical. 
Is it not striking how well this analysis accords with Derrida’s classic description of 
the quasi-method of deconstruction? 
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Taking into account that a name does not name the punctual simplicity of a 
concept, a conceptual structure centered on a given predicate, we proceed: (1) to 
the extraction of a reduced predicative trait that is held in reserve, limited in a 
given conceptual structure (limited for motivations and relations of force to be 
analyzed), named X: (2) to the de-limitation, the grafting and regulated extension 
of the extracted predicate, the name X being maintained as a kind of lever of 
intervention, in order to maintain a grasp on the previous organization, which is to 
be transformed effectively.23 
A model-theoretical interpretation of these methodological guidelines would have to 
focus on what Derrida says of the predicative trait named X. Its most elementary 
statement would hold that a conceptual structure—a system—is descriptively 
incomplete—inconsistent—if it permits a fundamental element and a derivative 
element to be specified as logically equivalent by a predicate that should not apply to 
the former but only to the latter. Thus it follows that the ‘deconstruction’ of any 
system takes place not only syntactically (by analysing the systematicity of the system) 
but also semantically (by varying the referential relations of the system). It is 
necessary, in other words, to try and see whether a system permits the construction of 
a possible world in which some such impermissible equivalence takes place. That for 
Derrida no system is ever entirely stable would thus imply that every system will permit at 
least one possible world that falls within the range of an unintended model. This is related to the 
equally classical Derridean imperative that the reading of a philosophical text ‘must 
always aim at a certain relationship, unperceived by the writer, between what he 
commands and what he does not command of the patterns of the language that he 
uses’24. A reading must relate the intended models of a system to the nonintended 
ones that the system nonetheless incorporates. And it is always upon the unintended 
model—whichever name the movement toward it assumes: writing, pharmakon, 
supplement, trace—that, for Derrida, the functioning of the system turns out to be 
founded. It is therefore necessary to add that every system will permit reference to at least one 
possible world that falls within the range of an unintended model that is necessary for the functioning 
of the system. This possible world is the paradoxico-critical locus where the system 
encodes itself and shows itself to be inconsistent. 
This argument makes it necessary to qualify, in a very modest way, Livingston’s 
interpretation of Derrida. It seems unequivocally true to say with Livingston that what 
Derrida calls the undecidable ‘always results from a complication of the relationship 
between the “inside” and the “outside” of a total system’ (PL 117). ‘This kind of 
complication’, Livingston continues, 
23 Derrida (1981), p. 71. 
24 Derrida (1997), p. 158. 
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results from the combination of two operations: first, the structural principles 
determining the meaning and value of elements within the total system are 
defined and described, as if from a point ‘outside’ the system itself; and second, 
this definition or description is recognized as in fact taking place, necessarily and 
problematically, within the total system whose structural principles are thereby 
defined and delimited. There is no reason to think that each of these two 
operations ought not to be singly possible, but their conjuction produces the 
paradoxical situation of a problematic term, such as différance, which both ‘has’ 
(in the extra-systematic sense) and ‘does not have’ (in the intra-systematic sense) 
a meaning. (PL 117.) 
Thus ‘what Derrida calls the “undecidable” always results from a semantical effect of 
syntax’ (PL 121–122). This leads to what Livingston calls an ‘essential crossing of syntax 
and semantics’ (PL 122)—a crossing that always depends on ‘a reflexive inscription of 
the total syntactic structure of language within itself’ (PL 179)—whereby ‘the terms 
that invoke the undecidable are locatable at the point at which syntax situates a kind 
of semantic gap or void essential to the text as such’ (PL 122). To this I would only add 
the following question: it being granted that each undecidable is undecidable only by 
virtue of a certain ‘formal or syntactic praxis’25 which advances ‘according to the 
irreducible excess of the syntactic over the semantic’26, is it not still the case that this 
formal or syntactic praxis is essentially interwoven into a movement of predication? A 
movement that always specifies some individual as its extension, and which is, then, a 
semantic movement? To propose this is not to fall back on an assumption of semantic 
plenitude. It matters but little that words like ‘hymen’ or ‘supplement’ have no full 
meaning of their own. These names, it ought to be remembered, assume importance 
as names of predicative traits, not as names of things. They stand for functions that assign 
to each situation a class of possible references. Thus the name ‘hymen’ comes to name 
something apart from the thing or concept ‘hymen’ as it is determined within the 
system. It names in addition a predication that is structurally indifferent to the 
individual of which the predicate can be said. And this predication is not just any 
predication but always a predication whose systematic position is a subordinate one, 
which means, quite importantly, that it can never aspire to foundational status. It is 
precisely such subordinate predications that a deconstructive reading will seek to 
extract and generalise. Only by finding out the intra-systematic thing to which the predicate 
applies may the undecidable be given a name. This name will also name the extra-systematic referent 
that contradicts the system by being accessible from within the system. This name will therefore 
remain provisional and limited in its operation to the system under consideration. 
25 Derrida (2004), p. 229. 
26 Derrida (2004), p. 230. 
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It is essential to note that such a reading cannot proceed in a purely syntactic or 
semantic fashion. ‘This word, this syllepsis’, Derrida says of the hymen, ‘is not 
indispensable [...]. It produces its effects first and foremost through the syntax [...] the 
suspense is due only to the placement and not to the content of words’27. The word is 
not indispensable, but one cannot dispense with the requirement that there be some 
word to be thus placed. Without some word proffering itself as the undecidable, the 
syntactical placement would be irretrievably lost. And the word to be selected as the 
‘occasion’ of the undecidable is always selected on the basis of a predicative structure. 
Yet by the same token it must be remembered that ‘a name does not name the 
punctual simplicity of a concept, a conceptual structure centered on a given predicate’28. 
A predicate cannot be the locus of undecidability if the structure—the syntax—is not 
already disposed towards it. The predicate, in other words, cannot posit itself but 
must be situated. 
V: A fifth orientation of thought 
My conclusion is therefore that the deconstruction of a system must be thought at 
once syntactically and semantically. The systematicity of the system is always 
deconstructible, but it requires a referential relation to something that can disrupt the 
smooth functioning of the system. The upshot is a new distinction between resolvable 
contradictions and essentially structural ones. In the passage already quoted, Hintikka 
says: 
Admittedly, before the logical consequences of a nonlogical theory T are spelled 
out, theory T does not yet reach out fully to things in themselves, independent of 
such by-products of our language as merely apparent possibilities concerning the 
world. But these consequences have to be obtained one by one no matter 
whether the logic is completely axiomatizable or not. What is crucial, in neither 
case is there any absolute limit which cannot be transgressed. It may be that our 
conceptual system and the language in which it is codified distort what we say of 
reality by means of this language. However, there is no limit beyond which these 
distortions cannot be eliminated. (LUCR 41) 
From a vantage point informed by Politics of Logic such asseverations stand 
testament to Hintikka’s criteriological orientation. My deconstructive response to this 
statement would be that indeed there is no limit beyond which a certain kind of 
distortion cannot be eliminated, but these distortions amount to nothing more than 
difficulties. Their sense as distortions is determined by an implicit teleologism, as the 
27 Derrida (2004), p. 230. 
28 Derrida (1981), p. 71. 
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refusal to accept any ultimate limit to logical progress relies on the regulative capacity 
of what Derrida calls an ‘Idea in the Kantian sense’29. All such pronouncements are 
traversed by what I would call the ineliminable liminality of the limit. The consequence—
as Derrida says regarding Husserl’s use of the Idea in the Kantian sense—is that the 
‘substitution of ideality for nonidentity, of objectivity for nonobjectivity, is infinitely 
deferred.’30 The distinctions at which such regulative Ideas aim—which are here the 
same for Hintikka as they are for Husserl—always end up ‘caught in the following 
aporia: de facto and realiter they are never respected [...]. De jure and idealiter they vanish, 
since, as distinctions, they live only from the difference between fact and right, reality 
and ideality. Their possibility is their impossibility’31. This translates into an argument 
vis-à-vis model theory that one cannot ever assume oneself to occupy a position where 
the possibility of non-standard models is absolutely eradicated. 
Yet this is not to say that all reference to the Idea—and thus to consistency 
without completeness—is to be renounced. The only thing to be refuted is consistency 
with completeness. It is, in other words, solely from the notion of telos as plenitude that 
Derrida departs: 
If nonplenitude (the non-telos) is therefore not an empirical accident of the telos, 
or even a simple negativity, one cannot not take into account as one might a 
contingent accident held in the margin out of concern for method or for eidetic 
purity. Whether it is a question of prediscursive experience or of speech acts, 
plenitude is at once what orients and endangers the intentional movement, whether 
it is conscious or not. There can be no intention that does not tend toward it, 
but also no intention that attains it without disappearing with it.32 
I argue that the question of the limit permits Derrida to be reinterpreted as both a 
paradoxico-critical and a quasi-criteriological thinker,33 even if, in terms of 
Livingston’s metalogical duality, he would have to be of either one or the other kind. 
Yet there is one last obstacle to be overcome. For it is in fact Derrida himself who 
denounces the possibility that the deconstruction of a system might have to do with a 
reference that the system cannot tolerate. Deconstruction, Derrida says, 
often consists, regularly or recurrently, in making appear—in each alleged 
system, in each self-interpretation of and by a system—a force of dislocation, a 
limit in the totalization, a limit in the movement of syllogistic synthesis. 
Deconstruction is not a method for discovering that which resists the system; it consists, 
29 Derrida (2005), 83–84. 
30 Derrida (1973), p. 100. 
31 Derrida (1973), p. 101. 
32 Derrida (1988), p. 129. 
33 See Derrida (1979), p. 133; Derrida (2005), pp. 136–137, pp. 144–145. 
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rather, in remarking, in the reading and interpretation of texts, that what has 
made it possible for philosophers to effect a system is nothing other than a 
certain dysfunction or ‘disadjustment’, a certain incapacity to close the system.34 
What I have sought to do in constructing the concept of iteratruth is to bring 
together these two movements which Derrida treats as oppositional. In doing so I will 
also have brought Derrida into closer proximity with Badiou than Livingston would 
be likely to accept35. Yet if this amounts to anything like a deconstruction—to ‘make 
appear’ the ‘force of dislocation’ in the ‘self-interpretation’ of Derrida’s system by 
inscribing the concept of iterability in the context of model theory—it will follow from 
the minimal definition of deconstruction that I will not have contradicted this self-
interpretation. The concept of iteratruth is therefore rendered undecidable with respect 
not only to Livingston’s metalogical duality—which thus emerges as a true description 
of Derrida’s thought—but also to Derrida’s self-description. 
The consequence of this is that a truly undecidable response to the Derridean 
response to Gödel’s undecidability is itself undecidable. When something is 
experienced as undecidable it can never be taken as decided whether the undecidable 
to be decided upon is fundamental (irresolvable) or epiphenomenal (resolvable). On 
the contrary: this, I argue, is the very thing to be decided each time. And each time 
the decision is without ultimate assurance. 
 
Such a relation to the undecidable calls for a new name. This new name will also 
be the name of the fifth orientation of thought which it has been my purpose to 
outline here. Its formalized description—more precisely, the formalized description of 
the predicative trait it is—would be as follows: ‘Any position that, recognizing the 
irreducible inscription of some unintended model within a totality, is forced to decide 
on the undecidable question whether the inscription of the unintended is due to a 
structural disposition or to a contingent failure of the system to specify its models 
correctly.’ The name of this orientation has to be selected both syntactically (in terms 
of the internal functioning of Politics of Logic) and semantically (in terms of the referent 
of which its predicative trait may be said). 
That name is Derrida. Not deconstruction, not the undecidable, but Derrida. 
Within the system of Politics of Logic, Derrida alone names the predicative trait that 
specifies a possible world which the system cannot contain without being 
contradicted. This possible world forms part of a model that the system founded upon 
the duality cannot have intended. In this unintended model the Derridean corpus is 
34 Derrida (2001), p. 7, my emphasis. 
35 See PL, p. 207 and pp. 219–224. 
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defined as undecidable with regard to the metalogical duality. The result of this is that 
the system itself is either inconsistent or incomplete. Affirming the paradoxico-critical 
orientation, one may acknowledge the inconsistency of the system; but then the 
system fails to grasp Derrida adequately (insofar as a model-theoretical interpretation 
of Derrida is defensible). Affirming the criteriological orientation, one may 
acknowledge the incompleteness of the system; but then one will have departed from 
the basic axioms of the system (insofar as it supports the paradoxico-critical 
orientation). 
The question to be followed would therefore be: of what, beyond the totality of 
the metalogical duality, is Derrida the name? And since the name is dispensable, 
having no full meaning of its own, by what other names may Derrida then be 
substituted? The semantic trajectory of this question must be referred to a syntactic 
matrix. That it cannot lie elsewhere than in Politics of Logic is what, for me, makes this 
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